Thing is, it's probably true for 1% of the cases, that things are slow for no good reason. Trick is how to identify that 1% of times when you can truly make something better. But 99% of the times, it's all shit and ends up like this, or similarly.
The irony is that, as near as I can tell, they cratered their balance sheet because they were heavily into long maturity bonds (i.e. super conservative).
Full quote: "The irony is that, as near as I can tell, they cratered their balance sheet because they were heavily into long maturity bonds (i.e. super conservative)."
What exactly makes you think that the "(i.e. super conservative)" remark is not about "long maturity bonds" - which is the think that he just referenced?
He didn't mention Treasuries at all. I find quite difficult to interpret the "super conservative" as being about some kind of long-maturity bonds relative to another kind of long-maturity bonds.
The problem isn’t what they bought it’s what they sold. It was all correlated. Loans to startups were going bad while startups were pulling deposits since they weren’t getting funded. So you’re taking losses while losing capital. Doesn’t really matter what else you’re holding at that point if it doesn’t happen to be skyrocketing right now. Long term bonds will never be that thing, but at any point in time almost nothing else would be, either.
