Google's hardware is just hardware. It is not locked down like the hardware of many other manufacturers. Moreover, it's the only such hardware which also allows you, the user, to lock it down for your own security. GrapheneOS is not just focused around avoiding Google, it's more accurately focused around security and user choice.
The goal is to give you the option to avoid needing to rely on Google's spying or services while not having to compromise on security.
None of these other solutions regularly get included in Celebrite's documentation as being an explicit benchmark of their software's ability to break into phones. And that's almost certainly due to the fact that unless you leverage hardware security features like what GrapheneOS (and stock Android on a Pixel, and iOS on an iPhone) utilises, you have no chance of going against any actual adversaries.
And I'm not just talking about state actors here, even drive-by opportunistic attacks are likelier on a random other phone running some other Android build.
So yeah, you are running Google hardware, that doesn't make you "googled". It's just a sad reflection on the reality of the hardware landscape. If you want the same security as what GrapheneOS offers, you will currently need to use a Pixel.
I'd be curious to see what comes out of their Motorola partnership though.
Why are we degoogling, for what purpose? I couldn't care less about giving them what likely amounts to ~10€ of margin per year on the hardware sale. What I care about is not giving them data which is worth a lot more than that, and to take back control over my device.
When you go with an alternative you lose superior privacy and security offered by GrapheneOS and you just end up leaking more data back to Google and other ad-tech companies than you would otherwise, negating any benefits several times over.
I think it’s very valid. I want to be hardware-independent, not only OS independent. I need graphene to work on a fairphone, jolla phone or whatever other alternatives there are. E/os can do that (to an extent), Graphene can’t for probably very good reason, but still: It‘s not an alternative then.
I must agree, you are right, GOS is only on Pixel phones.
But we have to keep in mind that /e/ has a lot of problems, the only one solved is sending data to Google. The security aspect of the OS is problematic and some key elements of a privacy seem questioning (AI integration, commercial collaborations, ...).
Uploading speech-to-text to OpenAI? Regular communication with Google? Using Google for assisted GPS? Giving a bunch of Google apps privileged access (if you need them for e.g. Android Auto)?
Well and besides that only shipping ASBs and no other security updates outside major Android releases (and both usually late). Using heavily outdated kernel trees (e.g. FP4 is using a Linux kernel patch level that hasn't been updated since 2020!), outdated vendor firmware blobs, etc.
It might work, but it is not very secure, nor very private.
The OS is working well, but have privacy and security concerns.
Is it better than a stock OS? I don't know, maybe, maybe not, it depends on the stock OS.
Reading the links posted in a sibling thread it only does it if you have text to speech enabled and they use an anonymizing proxy so openai can't associate sessions with any particular user ie it's not perfectly anonymous and private but I don't see how you could have totally anonymous and private until you have a fully offline on-device TTS model, which the fairphone guy said they tried and didn't feel it was up to scratch.
I don't use e/os but it doesnt' seem like a terrible compromise to me personally.
/e/OS is Android, meaning it's still critically dependent on goodwill of Google to continue releasing their work as part of AOSP.
So if you're trying to be a silly purist, then /e/OS doesn't fit either. If you're not, getting a Pixel will significantly enhance your safety since they're better supported for security patches and better designed in hardware when it comes to security.
I think it is legitimate to be a purist about smartphones, but I don't think the GP is. So, let's talk about the non-purist situation: Users like us want to de-google. But we are not willing to make all of the sacrifices that purists do. The question is then, what can we use (and - what projects can we support financially).
Now, we can use GrapheneOS if we have Google Pixel's. But - most people don't have those phones, for any number of reasons. One of them is price, by the way: You can get a decent smartphone for under 100 USD and even a half-decent one for 70 USD. And most people in the world are not in an economic situation where you can tell them "shell out 300 USD and buy a Google Pixel".
Moreover - suggesting we strengthen our ties to Google in order to de-Google is fundamentally problematic. Even if we're not going all the way, we are striving to distance ourselves from them.
So, an imperfect software solution for a wider selection of phones does sound quite useful. Change my mind! :-)
Could you not do this? There's no need to be hostile to people who purer than you are.
It's fine if you want to make a pragmatic decision to do what works now, but you depend on people who to some degree don't want to compromise. But I always suspect this type of hostility comes from guilt being directed outward; what you actually should want to do instead is support people who are refusing to compromise and building alternatives (even if those alternatives are just ways to get things done without phones.) You will need them one day.
The idea about being dependent on Google to continue to allow you to be hostile to Google on their hardware is intrinsically not sustainable.
You're basically the same as an somebody using whatever the phone company installs mocking somebody who would dare install GrapheneOS, or even an iPhone person ridiculing somebody for using Android at all. What's the use of that?
At least GrapheneOS is releasing up to date OS versions and patches very quickly, quicker than all the vendors except Google.
And in terms of the security, they release binary patches for the exploits under embargo until...... mid-2026. Remember November 2025 security bulletin? Multiple RCEs, media wrote articles about that.... Meanwhile GOS was long patched.
What is the most recent version? 3.5. What Android revision is it based on? Lineage 22.2, which is Android 15.
It also claims that it includes "all Android security patches available as of February, 2nd 2026" .....but not all patches get back ported, meaning they miss many fixes and improvements.
And that's just the start.
Tbh I'd rather run Lineage Os on the older phone that this.
The post about Graphene partnering with Motorola is right about this one, currently, (Lenovo bought Motorola from Google in 2014.), so that point will no longer be valid as soon as they ship something.
GOS is degoogled in all the ways that I care about - it's about the data they can gather. Among all the smartphone options that I consider usable day to day (leaving only Android and iOS at the moment), GOS is the most private and secure.
As someone who switched from FP4 with /e/OS to GrapheneOS - absolutely not true.
My reason for switching was a bug where the phone calls didn't display the caller number. So I switched to GOS in hope it would be better... and it is, but not in all areas. For example their insistence on not supporting MicroG leads to poor UX, because let's face it, you can't trust Google services, even sandboxed, to not syphon tons of data into the cloud. MicroG was easybto use for privacy. They also seem to be very opinionated about (not) using a firewall for privacy, like NetGuard, instead recommending some weird alternatives like DNS firewalls. And don't get me started on their icons - I don't mind ugly-ish icons, but they are taking the ugliness to a whole new level.
GrapheneOS is not a bad OS, but it is very opinionated, and they (heavily) prioritize security over privacy. When I turn FP4 on, I still like it way better than GOS. Still, I like seeing who is calling, so I'm not going back... Ymmv.
It is not, it is related to both major phone service providers in my country. Abroad, everything worked just fine. And just in 4G/5G, however 3G is getting phased out, so if I forced it, I was often unreachable.
I was wondering if I could fix it myself, but I'm not even sure if this is firmware or OS issue. I assume the former, which afaik is not opensource? Not sure.
I am not a project member so I cannot speak for GrapheneOS, but maybe I can help clear up some misunderstandings.
>insistence on not supporting MicroG leads to poor UX,
The problem they are trying to solve is apps not working without the presence of Google Mobile Services or Google Play. They don't want to compromise by having a component with high privileges integrated in their image that involves security issues like signature spoofing.
MicroG will send less data to Google partly because it is simply an incomplete implementation of the features offered by GMS (sanboxed-google-play appp compatibility is quite a bit higher), partly because the access is more granular or there are choices offered for services like location (GrapheneOS provides non-Google location services and community support on only installing and enabling the parts you need for specific app features to work). UX is not adversely affected, but if you want to use a privileged app bypassing security checks and sending data to Google anyway then you have the freedom to compile microG with it integrated if you would like.
>They also seem to be very opinionated about (not) using a firewall for privacy, like NetGuard, instead recommending some weird alternatives like DNS firewalls
GrapheneOS tries to implement or end encourage sustainable approaches to privacy and security, and this partially means approaches that don't break if the adversary knows what you are doing.
Egress/outbound traffic filtering is fundamentally unworkable. Apps do not have to connect to known privacy a invasive third party domains to violate your privacy or expose your data to extra parties, they can simply send anything they want to their own servers and do anything they like with the data. From my understanding this is why GrapheneOS do not want to encourage the approach of blocking apps from connecting to certain domains/addresses.
Instead they tackle the problem at its source by providing a direct AND indirect network access toggle which cuts off an apps access to the outernet without letting the app know (pretends the network is down). This makes it non trivial for apps to exfiltrate data and as a side effect can provide benefits like data conservation (for capped plans).
>instead recommending some weird alternatives like DNS firewalls.
DNS based solutions are offered (not promoted) if you want more control over your DNS query resolvers or you want to improve your quality of experience by blocking advertisements and malvertising domains.
>they (heavily) prioritize security over privacy.
Can you point out another OS project with real privacy features like a network permission, sensors data access permission, contact access scopes, storage access scopes, per connection MAC randomisation and so on? https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm They have even more plans for privacy like location scopes, anti-fingerprinting for Vanadium browser and maybe AnonymisedDNSCrypt/Oblivious DNS and probably more they haven't mentioned. If you suggest some more on their issue tracker they may get back to it when they have the resources.
To put my answer in context, I was replying to this:
> There's absolutely no reason to use /e/ when GrapheneOS exists.
There absolutely is. If I was choosing again today I would be tempted to switch back, for the reasons I listed. And I would probably miss many things you cited, like Storage and Contact Scopes.
As for MicroG, afaik I can't use it on GOS without considerable effort (recompiling OS) and probably also ongoing maintenance burden (updates). So this is not an option for me, FP5 with /e/OS is still better then.
NetGuard - very nice answer, shows exactly what you and GOS developers are missing! Yes, the actively hostile apps will exfiltrate data as soon as you let them contact anything on the outside. But most of the apps are by incompetent/lazy/pressured devs who just throw in some library and don't even care that it leaks data to Google. For example my banking app. Why the hell should Google be notified when I decide to open my banking app? If I cut its network, as you suggested, the app stops working. But if I just blacklist Google site for this app, the problem is solved. Of course, I don't want to cut it for all apps, because then some might not work. And that's just one of many similar examples.
That's why I said that the main focus of GOS is security, not privacy. If they cared about privacy primarily, they would actively support microG and NetGuard, or at least similar solutions.
That said, I am actually a fan of GrapheneOS, it is just so frustrating that we can't have it all in one package. Ah well.
>are by incompetent/lazy/pressured devs who just throw in some library and don't even care that it leaks data to Google
Even if I agreed with this statement, I don't understand why it is better to put limited/precious resources something the app developers can easily circumvent, praying they never stop being incompetent/lazy/pressured and tell device owners it is an important privacy feature? Instead of waiting for the apps to become actively hostile why not just feed them fake data in the first place? Like the scoped access permissions do?
If you really want to do this, you (and any GrapheneOS user) can do it today with mitmproxy and RethinkDNS but I think it is perfectly OK users choose their (privacy-invasive) apps and choose how to mitigate annoyances like that themselves. Otherwise they need to complain to the app developers and app stores.
>That's why I said that the main focus of GOS is security, not privacy. If they cared about privacy primarily, they would actively support microG and NetGuard, or at least similar solutions.
That feels more like you are framing your opinion as a fact. To me it is not so obvious.
When I think of privacy, I think of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (https://petsymposium.org/). I also think of things like:
If you can use GrapheneOS, good for you but what /e/OS offers is:
- Usable Android with your usual Android app (banking, etc)
- No data sent to Google by default
- Easier interface with nearly no bloatware
- Available easily on many smartphones, including older ones
- Extending the life of some smartphones
The price to pay is:
- Some Murena cloud bloatware
- Android security patches are sometimes delayed
- Security is not on par with GrapheneOS
If your main concern is protecting your privacy from Google and extending the life of your smartphone without breaking a sweat, /e/OS is probably the best option.
If your main concern is protecting against state actors attacks or very specific threats, then GrapheneOS might be better.
/e/OS works really great for non-techie users. I’ve done it in my family.
I have phones with both, but I don't necessarily agree that /e/OS is easier. E.g. things like doing or restoring in-app purchases often do not work, even when logging in through microG. Want that nice backup option that Signal is now offering? Well, good luck, you cannot purchase it on /e/OS (at least I couldn't). In general when it comes to compatibility, my experience is that GrapheneOS is better because it can use real Google Play Services, albeit sandboxed. I think you can use the Play Store on /e/OS as well, but it's going to have higher privileges.
They also use Google for assisted GPS when you use it, eSIM provisioning, widevine provisioning. Last time I checked, microG on /e/OS also downloads a Google binary blob for SafetyNet.
Besides analytics, if you install Google Apps (e.g. for Android Auto), many of them get higher privileges on /e/OS.
The price to pay is:
I would also add installing F-Droid apps (if you use App Lounge) through 'CleanAPK', without wanting to reveal why this is necessary or who owns/maintains CleanAPK.
They do quite a lot of fishy stuff. It may be incompetence, but yeah...
If your main concern is protecting against state actors attacks or very specific threats
This always sounds like systems like GrapheneOS are for paranoid people. But this is basically you if you ever go to a demonstration (e.g. in the US) or cross borders of certain countries (e.g. of the US), sadly things like Cellebrite have become very common. Then suddenly layered protection, not running years behind in security patches, a duress pin, or rebooting after not unlocking for a few minutes to get back to BFU aren't so bad. (IANAL, figure out yourself which of these are legal and not destruction of evidence.)
GrapheneOS is just another OS. It's no less usable than /e/ and it is no more difficult to get a phone with it than /e/. You can purchase both preinstalled.
I find it interesting that there are so many comments that are saying "Don't use this one use this one it's better!"
But what I think a lot of people are missing is what you exactly just touched on. We have options! That's a good thing. Yeah, some options are not as good as others if you wanna optimize for X. Then don't use that option! Use the option that works for you.
To me, the fact that alternatives exist on varying spectra of "degoogle-fication" is a win in my book. The fact that we're able to talk about and recommend so many alternatives is a good thing.
I think it's not a bad thing that people make the "Don't use this one use this one it's better!" comment, at least from my perspective. That is one way I end up learning about the options I have!
There absolutely is when your concern is not only moving away from Google but also using sustainable hardware like Fairphone, which GrapheneOS doesn't support afaik.
Even on non-pixel devices, unless you really want to use the /e/ "ecosystem, there are probably better options like LineageOS for microG iodéOS.
(/e/ used to be heavily based on an outdated version of LineageOS for microG. I'm not sure what the current state is after I settled on second-hand pixel with graphene)
iodé is available for my device as well, but it looked fairly similar to /e/OS to me (and the latter has an official partnership with my phone's manufacturer). What makes it a better option - should I switch?
When I looked into it, /e/ constantly used to be many months late with security updates. LineageOS for microg and iodé were much quicker (~ 1 month max which is still not that great).
Hmm, possibly I'm looking in the wrong place, but as far as I can remember, I've been getting new /e/OS versions about every month, and looking at the release notes [1], they usually seem to include the latest "Android security patches", which I assume is what's relevant - unless there's something else that should also be included?
It gets Android OS feature updates not security/firmware updates. GOS aims to be the most secure OS possible without compromise so they aren't supporting devices without them.
Pixel 3a only offered 3 years of security updates. Current GOS supported devices support up to 7 years.
Because upstream LineageOS doesn't support microg out of the box. You can install it but it needs signature spoofing to pass Google's SafetyNet garbage.
Bonus point for some roms that allow you to relock the bootloader after the install (iodéOS, CalyxOS).
https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm