Online revocation is pointless. It sounds like you didn't actually read the article, but are happy to slam the one team on the Internet that has given serious consideration to the obviously-broken SSL revocation system. Can I ask you to take a breath and reread the article?
So is getting a subset of revoked certs Google deems "valuable." In fact, that may be even more dangerous since it establishes first class secure sites vs everyone else.
Why should Yahoo's cert revocatins get in the CRLsets but not less well known sites? How is that less broken than online revocation?
Keep in mind, my big objection is:
Google did not distribute our certificate vocation in their CRLSet, presumably because we weren't large enough. That is not a fix for anything.
Ok, fair enough. I am just making sure my objection to Google's approach is clear.
I would be OK if they guaranteed complete CRLsets from all participating CA's. Since they don't, their solution is more broken than what they are replacing.
So I acknowledge that online revocation is problematic. I just think the crlset approach is an order of magnitude worse when the crlset is a subset of revoked entries sent by the ca.
Respectfully, I think an accurate summary of your argument is that you would rather pretend to be secure using broken online revocation checks than to have to stomach the Chromium team providing a marginal amount of actual security by deciding which sites are and aren't worthy of protection.
The implied-preference-set shouldn't be restricted to the false binary choice of "the broken standardized system" and "Google's half-fixed proprietary approach".
With the talent & resources that Google has, or the talent & resources that Mozilla has, or the talent & resources that Microsoft has, this should have been better solved, in a way that works for all TLS-reliant applications, years ago.
Using Chrome's built-in auto-updates to make a subset of "high-value revocations" work, at a daily frequency, for Chrome users only, is not a very web-friendly solution.
It's like a gated community hiring its own rent-a-cops... maybe that's an improvement for the fortunate ones on the inside, and maybe a necessary stopgap. But to people outside that perimeter – like someone whose revocation doesn't make it into the Google CRLSet – it feels like an abdication of duty by the web's stewards.
Christ, this kind of reactionary armchair criticism really is a cancer of HN these days.
Adam has been pushing the state of the art in cryptography in the practical realm for years, and your criticism is "They should have just solved this problem better! They should just pull their finger out and get working on it."
Making a real difference in the chaotic realm of standards bodies and browser vendors is a lot harder than it looks. Adam has an impressive track record for actually improving internet security for users.
Where's your suggestion for how revocation could be solved better and implemented in a practical way? I don't see you rolling up your sleeves to get the actual work done.
Yes. It has been for a long time. Long term, we want to figure out ways to improve thread quality. Not so much in terms of the toxicity problem, which has seen some progress lately (we hope), but the arguably harder problem of voluminous uninformed commentary clustering around the mean. If you (or anyone) have any suggestions, I'd love to hear them. hn@ycombinator.com is the best place to send them.
(This is not about any particular comments in the current thread, only the problem in general.)
The criticism isn't specifically for Langley, but rather for all of Google-Mozilla-Microsoft. They've all been derelict on this, knowing the certificate-revocation standards are hopelessly broken, but not fixing it from their positions of power and responsibility.
(Might it take a product-liability lawsuit, where somebody suffers financial loss because Chrome is deceptively showing the "secure" indicator even for certificates revoked days/weeks/longer ago?)
Consider the CRLSet approach. Maybe it's the best any browser-maker has done, and a useful learning-exercise for a future industry-wide fix. But it still sucks. It's capped at 250KB, assembled via an opaque editorial process, only refreshed daily, only protective of Chrome users and some chosen subset of "high priority" certificate-revocations, and still vulnerable to an arbitrarily-long attacker embargo against the Chrome update servers. Langley himself mentions it can't scale to the recent need for higher-volume revocations.
Compare it with Google's own "Safe Browsing" blacklist system. That delivers megabytes of compressed privacy-protecting blacklists, constantly refreshed via incremental updates to maintain a freshness of under 45 minutes, in a manner available to all browser makers.
So a potential version 1 of a better approach: leverage Safe Browsing to deliver fresher certificate blacklists to more end-users, and also warn users (not just silent-fail) if they're making 'secure' connections but are too-many-hours behind the best available revocation information.
However, the implication that I, as a lone individual, must "roll up my sleeves to get the actual work done" for my words to have weight here is both nonsensical and (speaking of rhetorical cancers on HN) unnecessarily personal. Google, with plentiful expertise and cash, is shipping the world's most popular browser – but that browser has multiple inadequate certificate-revocation systems. Yet I should be contributing my expertise to fix this before I may speak? "Christ", that.
Google, with its plentiful expertise and cash, counts as its two fiercest competitors two of the three organizations that would need to agree with any new solution to revocation.
Meanwhile, you've offered a "sketch of a solution" that involves CAs (a) cooperating with Google and (b) employing computer science in the pursuit of writing actual code. Why not talk to Comodo and see how likely that is to happen?
You know who thinks CRLsets suck? Adam Langley. Certificate revocation is broken. They did what they could. Google didn't design SSL revocation.
All Google has done is orchestrate the adoption of TLS forward secrecy, fixed security vulnerabilities (for many years running) in OpenSSL (along with virtually every other component to modern web browsers, along with ffmpeg and the open source video stack), invented and deployed browser certificate pinning, spearheaded the deployment of Certificate Transparency, oh, and found/fixed Heartbleed.
But, I'm sure your comments are great. Why not take them to the IETF TLS WG? I'm sure you'll find an eager audience. I am not kidding.
Cooperation of competitors is not necessary — that's an excuse for inaction. As with 'Safe Browsing' (or CRLSet), one browser could lead the way, letting the others follow the same model or improve later.
Similarly, CA buy-in is not a blocking prerequisite for a better approach — it's just another excuse for inaction. Exactly as with CRLSet, the browser vendor can say, "we'll scrape your revocations where we can find them, or you can provide them this way". Then, if an incompetent or recalcitrant CA hides their revocations, it's an issue between the CA and their harmed customers.
It's great you, me, and Adam Langley all agree that revocation is broken, including Google's stopgap proprietary solution. But hasn't everyone understood that for 15+ years? Why isn't there a fix?
The browser makers absolutely own responsibility for this, because they're the ones that show end-users a security indicator. They're shipping the software that creates a risk, they can unilaterally fix this on their own initiative, and they're not so poor or stupid that fixing it should be beyond their capabilities.
Yes, Google has done a lot for security. Their 'web security karma' is very net-positive. They still deserve a demerit, along with Mozilla and Microsoft, on this particular issue.
Referring this to the IETF for standardization is just another way of excusing more inaction and delay.
Why are TLS block cipher constructions still MAC-then-encrypt, 13 years after Bellare and Namprempre proved that was the wrong way to do it? Because standards are hard.
You can blame the browser makers as much as you want, but among them as a group, nobody has worked harder on making TLS better and safer than Google. But here you are berating them for the effort.
Here's the thing. I have been advertising the impact of this decision by Chrome on our SaaS business. It just isn't acceptable that cert revocation means one thing if you are Yahoo but another if you are a startup SaaS business.
As I have said repeatedly, this is a way to ensure that things are comfortable enough for the people at the top that everyone else is sacrificed in the name of it being too much trouble, working for free, etc. But as long as the big sites are protected by Google, nothing will get fixed and us smaller competitors will be screwed.
I am sorry, but that's just morally wrong. And it is the major reason I now recommend Firefox over Chrome.
Again, standards don't need to be a blocker for the revocation issue (as CRLSet itself demonstrates). "Standards are hard" is an excuse for inaction.
I can applaud Google's efforts in general yet still point out when there's one egregious, embarrassing gap. They are one of the only three institutions worldwide that could possibly fix this for users, and I'm not picking on them over the others.
If Amazon, Yahoo, and the small SaaS provider are in the same boat security-wise, then you have the incentive to get the root problems fixed. Google's approach takes away that incentive from the large providers.
I don't think it is just a question of pretending. It is a question of making sure that everyone is in the same boat security-wise so that the root problems in fact get addressed.
What Google does is make Amazon more secure and the small SaaS provider less so. And it makes sure that the big providers have less incentive to fix the underlying concerns.
The Chromium team didn't choose how big to make the lifeboat. They have the one they have. If they've got to choose between putting Amazon in it or you, then, as a user, I'm glad they chose rationally.
It looks to me like the Chromium team did choose the size of the lifeboat: it's a Google-designed feature (CRLSet) based on another Google-designed feature (auto updates).
Isn't CRLSet a Google invention? Doesn't it depend on Chrome software updates?
All I know about it, I read from Langley's writings. Is there a better reference?
Who set the implemntation limits, if not Google?
Maybe those limits are justifiable, but that doesn't leave someone who's left unprotected, by what seem like arbitrary policy cutoffs, feeling any better.
Your feelings aren't material to the issue at hand. You're not supposed to feel good about CRLsets.
Google didn't invent this idea. It was suggested by the CABForum.
CRLsets are static, practically hardcoded revocations that every installation of Chrome receives. The idea that https://yourblog.com should expect specific consideration in Chrome updates is about as reasonable as suggesting that we revert back from the DNS to host files.
Yes, feelings are immaterial, but you shouldn't be trying to convince with bluster when you've erred on the facts.
The more I read, the more it seems CRLSet implementation choices were entirely Google's. For example, when CABForum members want information about how CRLSets work, Langley suggests the best (and only!) reference is the Chrome source code:
I am of course open to better information. But for now it still looks like Google did indeed "choose how big to make the lifeboat", unlike your assertion to the contrary.
Also, it looks like the 250KB cap is in Google's unpublished server-side source that constructs the CRLSets. So Google could conceivably "expand the lifeboat" unilaterally with a tiny edit!
For reference, it appears the current 'Safe Browsing' blacklists, never more stale than 45 minutes, are about 2.3MB in size. So the CRLSet cap (250KB) and freshness (1 day) aren't very generous to users.
I said that the idea came from CABForum because that's what Langley said. Moving from 250k to 2.3M still wouldn't put your blog in the lifeboat. Also: the CRL entries in the CRLsets are manually curated; someone is doing that work for you, for free.
And I understood correctly about who chose the "size of the lifeboat", also because of what Langley said.
The person upthread unhappy that Chrome didn't pick up their revocation (einhverfr) isn't worried about a measly blog, but their SaaS business.
If 2.3MB isn't enough to protect everybody, make it 23MB or take whatever other design steps are necessary. The world's most popular browser, from the world's most profitable internet company, in 2014 shouldn't be showing the lock-icon and "valid certificate" hours/days/weeks after a publicly-available revocation.
"Manual curation", rather than being impressive, is a design-smell here. And none of Google's work to outcompete other browsers, using proprietary Chrome features, is being done for me "for free".
