Russia was using those bombers to terrorize their cities night after night. Ukrainians are not required to (nor will they) sit back and take it out of abstract MAD force balance concerns. If Russia cared that much about the value strategic aviation holds in their nuclear doctrine, they wouldn't be using it to chuck missiles at chldren's cancer hospitals and apartment blocks.
If you want to try to impose some deeper strategic meaning onto this, a more plausible one would be the reverse: that the more "western powers" pull back from supporting Ukraine, the more Ukraine is are forced to establish they are capable of less conventional, less predictable, more aggressive means of deterrence to compensate for the absence of strong western partners.
> Ukrainians are not required to (nor will they) sit back and take it out of abstract MAD force balance concerns.
Ukraine has very strong interests, but they have in fact restrained themselves from doing things that will provoke a war involving NATO. The US government has put many restrictions on Ukraine that Ukraine has abided by.
MAD isn't "abstract", if by abstract you mean somehow unreal. It has kept the humanity from being destroyed for generations, and the US and Russia invest a lot in maintaining it.
Strategic aviation is the least important and most dual-purpose of any of the three branches of the nuclear triad, and by this point Ukraine has ample justification for attacking it. It's an abstract concern in that sense. Destroying their entire strategic aviation forces would not meaningfully impact MAD.
> Destroying their entire strategic aviation forces would not meaningfully impact MAD.
The only person I see saying that is some random Internet commenter. I've always heard the opposite from professionals in the field, especially that any threat to capability is a threat to stability.
As I've heard from professionals, Kyiv will not stand more than three days against Russia in a full scale military conflict.
Strategic bombers make little sense, that's why everyone (even russians) are pushing for ballistic missiles instead. Strategic bombers used by Russia manly for terror with stockpile of soviet missiles.
Strategic bombers still make a lot of sense if you need to, let's say, hold Iranian nuclear facilities at risk with large conventional bunker buster bombs. This is the primary mission that B-2 squadrons train for, and just the existence of that capability provides a lot of negotiating leverage. Of course it's also enormously expensive.
It is in fact stealth. Look up any information on it and it will tell you, it's a stealth bomber. Its primary capability is defeating enemy air defenses and holding their most valuable assets at risk.
B2 is much easier to intercept than ballistic missile. Also B2 has order of magnitude higher sticker price than ballistic missile. Good for bombing mujahedeen in the mountains and bad against someone with SAM. But for such bombing you don't need a strategic bomber, even frontline bomber could be enough.
> B2 is much easier to intercept than ballistic missile. Also B2 has order of magnitude higher sticker price than ballistic missile. Good for bombing mujahedeen in the mountains and bad against someone with SAM.
Where do people get these things? The B2 is awful for bombing low-tech insurgent forces - far too expensive to operate. Its whole purpose is defeating SAMs in particular and the best defenses in the world.
Eventually you need new a new plane; that doesn't mean the old one is a failure.
The US has only ~20 B-2s, to go with ~60 B-52s (originally built in the 1950s), and ~40 B-1Bs (~1980s tech). Only the B-2 could survive war with a peer, afaik; that was fine after the Cold War when there was no peer threat but now that China is a near-peer threat, the US needs many more bombers capable in a peer conflict and the B-2 production line was shut down decades ago (production was discontinued when the Cold War ended). They plan to build the B-21 in much larger numbers.
Also, the B-21 was built for conflict with China, where distances are much greater than in Europe.
Oh, I wasn't being sarcastic: I was trying to convey that B-2 has been a great success (at least in the eyes of the Pentagon). The B-21 looks almost exactly like the B-2 (but is half the size / weight).
Nah. Conventionally armed ballistic missiles or small strike aircraft aren't effective against deeply buried hardened bunkers, like Iranian or North Korean uranium refinement facilities. Only something like a B-2 carrying a GBU-57 will be effective for holding such targets at risk. This is considered a strategic imperative so cost is irrelevant.
Right. I'm repeating what actual experts say - including settled, consensus conclusions from decades of expertise. I'm not doing personal hot takes and if I did, they should be ignored. I'm not even posting expert hot takes, which also aren't so valuable (but much more valuable than my own).
I responded to this comment: "Destroying their entire strategic aviation forces would not meaningfully impact MAD."
Well, consider North Korea. With them there's no "mutual" in the assured destruction to their side if they launched a nuke. How is that less a deterrent?
It's a good question and the answer is that the situation is unstable and dangerous. But I think you are approaching it backwards:
With almost every country in the world, the US has first strike capability - the US could wipe out the country in hours or less, and only a few countries have a second strike capability to deter the US.
That had long been true with NK, a very belligerent enemy. But in the last couple of decades NK added a small nuclear arsenal. It's not enough for a MAD relationship with the US, but they could threaten great harm to US allies South Korea and Japan - imagine nuking Seoul and Tokyo - and possibly land one on US territory. It wouldn't destroy the US, but losing San Francisco is a serious deterrent.
Did the addition of NK's nuclear arsenal stabilize the situation by creating more deterrent, or destabilize it by emboldening NK? It's complex:
One factor is that the US has sworn off use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts, even ones they are losing, and have strictly adhered to that policy, not even using small tactical nukes. The US has an even stronger motive - it establishes a global taboo against nuclear weapon use that nobody has violated yet. NK is very aware of it because US generals recommended using nuclear weapons in the Korean War and the president declined - that may seem like too close a call for NK, and don't assume that NK understands the US nearly as well as you do (if you are American); miscalculations like that are common on all sides in international relations.
So now that NK has nuclear weapons, does that make a conventional conflict into a nuclear one, destabillizing the situation? What if the US believes they need to use nuclear weapons to prevent NK from using them on Seoul or San Franciso?
On the other hand, NK's nukes may prevent a conventional war. NK saw what happened to Iraq - everyone did, and many realized that actual nuclear weapons were their only defense if the US was going to ignore international law and sovereignty and engage in 'regime change'.
I read somewhere that they still have their Tu-160s (at least). They have limited engine lifespan, so the Russians have been reluctant to use them for the terror sorties.
Yes but arguably, MAD is currently more relevant between the US and China.
Given the economic/international stance of Russia for the past three decades and the maintenance level of their armed forces, their ability to execute a first-strike nuclear attack and succeeding is pretty low.
I personally find it astounding that people still talk about MAD when even Reagan was scared into accepting it was flawed. You can see the big change in his foreign policy position before and after - from confrontation to negotiation. As much as I loathe most of Reagan's political views, in retrospect he's been proven a lot more astute at least in this specific area of foreign policy than basically everyone who still pushes MAD.
E.g.:
> "But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike"
If you think the other side is crazy enough to consider a first strike, MAD goes out the door and it becomes rational to consider preempting them if you think you have any chance at all to reduce the damage. And the greater damage potential the other side has, the more imperative this becomes.
MAD has for very long struck me as a rationalisation of an emotional desire to have the more destructive weapon, rather than a rational argument for this reason - there are so many scenarios where it increases risk rather than reduces it.
You then have a choice to make, and to Reagans credit he chose to try to pull things back from the brink, recognising it was more dangerous to try to one-up the Soviet Union than to talk to them.
Though it seems to me it's likely far more rational in general to posture even less, and intentionally back down to a point where you have enough to make an attack on yourself cost sufficiently more than it is worth to still deter, but little enough that preempting you isn't a matter of preventing total destruction. As a bonus the less aggressive posturing would seem less likely to make the other side think you're preparing to strike first.
Spot on. I'm watching in horror from the other side of the Atlantic as I see the USA descend into violence. The mad king is leaving a lot of blood in his wake.
You now have 18 comments in this thread. All of them shallowly criticizing the comments you reply to, including appeals to (vague) authority and a whole bag of tricks to make it seem as if the original commenter is clueless and you hold all the cards. I also don't see you take up any position of your own. What is your point with all this? That Ukraine should just roll over and accept that they're going to get bombed without ever striking back? That they should take into account all of the geopolitical effects of their moves before they think about their own survival? I can't make heads or tails of all of the words you've spent on this subject. Please enlighten.
To be clear, I'm not faulting Ukraine for doing this. It appears to have been a well executed and wildly innovative plan. There were no (that I'm aware of) civilian losses on either side. Sounds about as good as it can be.
I'm just speculating what, if any, geopolitical ramifications arise from this. Sometimes consequences happen even when you're 'the good guy'. Life is often not like the stories and things sometimes end up terribly even when you do everything right.
Any US adversary must be building sleeper cells in the continental US armed with drones from walmart/bestbuy ready to drop a grenade that will burn big and expensive planes/submarines/aircraft carriers, possibly even rocket silos or other parts of critical infrastructure.
If I were Iran/NK, or China, that would be my top priority, so that I could retaliate if USA attacks first
If you want to try to impose some deeper strategic meaning onto this, a more plausible one would be the reverse: that the more "western powers" pull back from supporting Ukraine, the more Ukraine is are forced to establish they are capable of less conventional, less predictable, more aggressive means of deterrence to compensate for the absence of strong western partners.